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The Effects of Malpractice on Medical Specialties
Abstract
I am concentrating my project on the effects of the growth of medical malpractice suits. One of the main
goals of the medical malpractice system is to provide incentives for physicians to take appropriate
precautions in medical treatment. However, I would like to explore whether increased malpractice activity
has adversely affected the medical labor market, particularly in regards to the specialties that doctors are
choosing to enter.
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The Effects of Malpractice on Medical
Specialties
Mindy Mannlein

I. Introduction
US. Therefore, they suspect that in the absence of
Tort law refers to the set of legal rules and
such investment, the rate of economic growth experipractices that govern wrongful injuries to persons or
enced in the late 1980s would have been substanproperty (Culyer & Newhouse, 2000). In todays
tially higher. For instance, the cost of tort litigation in
high-tech, fast-paced world, the use of the law as a
1985 was $17,350,000,000. In other words, roughly
resource for blame and compensation is highly uti$17 billion could have been employed in productive
lized. One of the best demonstrations of this mentalventures or in leisure but was instead removed from
ity is the reaction of the American people to the terthe production possibilities of the economy. Morerorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For instance,
over, that figure is quite dated and is therefore not
in Florida, two men filed a $1.1 trillion lawsuit against
nearly representative of the total expenditure on tort
Osama bin Laden, claiming that his terrorist acts have
law today.
threatened them with personal injury and forced them
Looking at a specific field of tort litigation, the
to re-fortify their bomb shelters. Additionally, they
frequency and severity of malpractice claims have risen
accuse bin Laden of causing them to suffer from high
dramatically since the late 1960s, leading to what
blood pressure and stomach
some refer to as the malpracdisorders, though they actice insurance crisis. For inThe
increased
volume
and
seknowledge that it is highly
stance, from 1975 to 1984,
verity of tort litigatioin is a topic
unlikely that he will actually
claims per physician rose an
show up in court (Bin Laden
of concern for economists beaverage of 10% annually, and
Lawsuit, 2001). Moreover,
between 1982 and 1986,
cause it means that vast
the wife of a man who perclaim frequency per 100 phyamounts of wealth are being
ished in the September 11 atsicians rose from 13.5 to 17.2
tied up in transfer activity.
tack on the World Trade
a year (Danzon, Pauly, &
Center is suing bin Laden and
Kington, 1990). Additionally,
the Taliban for at least $5 million in a wrongful death
awards for medical malpractice cases have risen,
lawsuit (McKay, 2001). Perhaps more than the bomb
nearly doubling between 1985 and 1995, from
raids and other acts of retaliation by the US military,
$211,711 to $398,426 (Medical Malpractice
bin Laden should fear the onslaught of lawsuits - or
Awards , 1997). This trend in the increased freperhaps not.
quency of claims and higher awards is reflected in
Regardless, the increased volume and severity
higher insurance premiums for doctors.
of tort litigation is a topic of concern for economists
Therefore, I am concentrating my project on the
because it means that vast amounts of wealth are beeffects of the growth of medical malpractice suits.
ing tied up in transfer activity. In a study by Lab and
One of the main goals of the medical malpractice sysand Sophocleus (1992) on resource investment in
tem is to provide incentives for physicians to take
transfer activity in the US for 1985, it was found that
appropriate precautions in medical treatment. Howtransfer seeking constitutes a significant fraction, at
ever, I would like to explore whether increased malleast 11%, of all economic activity conducted in the
practice activity has adversely affected the medical
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labor market, particularly in regards to the specialties
that doctors are choosing to enter. How reactive are
doctors to the fear of litigation and financial pressure
of rising insurance premiums? Are doctors in certain
specialties more reactive to these stimuli than other
doctors?
Thus, the main goal of this paper is to examine
the effects of malpractice on certain medical specialties to determine if it is acting as a supply shock in the
medical labor market. Accordingly, Section II evaluates the existing literature relating to medical malpractice, while Section III introduces the theoretical framework behind medical malpractice and liability in general. Section IV then presents the empirical model,
followed by Section V which discusses the results of
the model. Finally, Section VI draws conclusions from
the results in Section V and proposes future ideas for
research.
II. Literature Review
This section looks at three studies. First, Kessler
and McClellan (1997) examine the relationship between liability reforms, malpractice pressure, and physician perceptions of medical care. They find that
physicians, especially those that have been recently
or frequently sued, most definitely change their practices. In the context of their study, a change in practice means the use of defensive medicine, or performing extensive, unnecessary testing as protection
against malpractice claims. Thus, the important finding of this study is the proof that malpractice has altered physician behavior. Therefore, it opens the
possibility that malpractice could also alter physicians
choice of specialty, as I hypothesize.
In another study, Kletke (2000) projects the size
and demographic composition of the US physician
workforce until the year 2020. He finds that an aggregate increase in the physician supply from 1998 to
2020 is likely but with a decreasing annual net increase. Furthermore, the percent of physicians choosing to go into primary care specialties, which have
lower malpractice insurance premiums, will rise, while
other specialties will decline. Perhaps malpractice is
a key player in this projected change in workforce
composition. There are other possible explanations
for this increase in primary physicians, such as the
increase in the number of HMOs. However, as of
1998, only 2.1 percent of doctors were general practitioners, and of that 2.1 percent only a small percent
participated in HMOs (Pasko, Seidman, & Birkhead,
37
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2000). Thus, HMOs will not likely have a significant
impact on this area.
Finally, Danzon, Pauly, and Kington (1990) study
the effects of medical malpractice on rising healthcare
costs. Their study finds evidence from 1976-1983
suggesting that increased medical malpractice costs
reflected in greater insurance costs were being passed
on rapidly to patients through higher fees, with little
impact on physician net incomes. However, they also
emphasize that their conclusions stemmed from data
that predated the sharp increase in malpractice premiums in the mid-1980s. They suggest that the passthrough of cost increases in later years might very well
be less rapid due to a more competitive market for
physician services and more aggressive cost-control
practices of third-party payers, such as Medicare and
HMOs. Therefore, after the mid-1980s, medical malpractice has a greater chance of having an effect on
physician behavior. Thus, I plan to explore more recent trends in physician behavior to see if their hypothesis is correct.
III. Theory
First, it is important to understand the theory
behind liability. In general, the primary purpose of
liability is to reduce the rate of inappropriate accidents during otherwise beneficial activities. Basically,
liability is supposed to minimize risks to consumers.
However, this reduction in accidents comes at a cost
(Culyer & Newhouse, 2000). Since safety can be
viewed as a good, efficient investment in safety requires producing both the efficient level of safety and
using the lowest cost mix of inputs. Thus, to effectively minimize the total social cost of accidents, both
the cost of accidents and the cost of injuries must be
taken into account. In a cost-benefit sense then, liability can only be justified as an efficient institution
for dealing with risk if its deterrence benefits outweigh
its added costs (Culyer & Newhouse, 2000).
When specifically dealing with the malpractice
liability, a crucial component of any cost-benefit evaluation of the malpractice system must take into account the effects of liability on physicians behavior
(Culyer & Newhouse, 2000). A supply shock to the
medical labor market, might be an added cost of liability. Generally, a shock will shift the entire labor
supply curve to the left, thus reducing the number of
workers at each wage. In effect, by testing the effects of medical malpractice liability, I am also contributing to the cost-benefit analysis of the theory be-
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hind liability.
Next, one must consider the decision criteria an
individual uses to choose an occupation. It is assumed
that the rational individual will choose the occupation
that best maximizes his or her utility through net benefits. Given multiple choices of occupations, Choices
= occ1, occ2, occ3, , occx, the following equation
results:
PVi = Sum (Net Benefits)
_____________
(1 + r )
where PVi is the present value of net benefits in occupation i.
The question, then, is what quantifies the net
benefits for a physician? Specifically, the decision to
specialize can be determined by analyzing the economic returns to specialty training. These returns can
be summarized as follows: If a doctor goes immediately into private practice instead of specializing, a
certain expected path of income is achievable. If the
doctor specialized, some added years of training take
place, at reduced incomes (during the period of residency), and then the doctor can earn higher incomes.
What discount rate makes these two choices equivalent? (Phelps, 1992) In other words, the main determinant in the decision to specialize is income, or
compensation. Therefore, the main positive component of any net benefit equation for physicians is compensation, which is composed of salary and fringes,
such as conferences, free samples, and other perks
of being a physician. Conversely, training costs negatively impact net benefits. Furthermore, I propose
that malpractice is a new cost to physicians. Hence,
an equation for net benefits for physicians could resemble the following:
Net Benefits = Salary + Fringes  (Training
costs + Insurance costs/monetary equivalent
of the risk of a malpractice suit, etc.)
IV. Research Design
To test my research hypothesis, I will look at
the five main categories of medical specialty - General/Family Practice, Internal Medicine, General Surgery, Pediatrics, and Obstetrics/Gynecology- over the
period 1982 to1998. More specifically, I will examine how malpractice affects employment in these spe-

cialties, while controlling for salary. However, before
delving into an econometric model, I will first examine descriptive statistics to see if patterns can be visually perceived in the data.
Accordingly, Table 1 shows the percent change
in employment from 1997 to 1998 in each specialty.
Additionally, it lists the average malpractice insurance
premium paid per physician as well as the average
salary received per physician for each specialty. The
malpractice and salary data are from 1995 in an effort to capture the lag in the time between when a
medical student decides on a specialty and when they
actually enter into the workforce after training in that
specialty. At first glance, it would appear that perhaps compensating wage differentials are at work in
the medical field since the specialties with the highest
premiums, Surgery and Obstetrics/Gynecology, also
have the highest salaries. However, it is also worth
noting that those two specialties have the lowest employment growth rates, with the exception of Internal
Medicine which also has a negative growth rate for
that year. Thus, this implies that the salaries may still
not be high enough to compensate for the risk.
Examining the relationship between employment,
malpractice premiums, and salaries further leads to
Table 2, which depicts the growth in all three areas
from 1983 to 1998 for each specialty. Malpractice
premiums have risen at a greater rate than salaries for
all specialties, though the largest increase was in the
Obstetrics/Gynecology field where malpractice premiums grew by 225.9% while salary only grew by
105.7%. Surgery and Obstetrics/Gynecology, with
the highest average malpractice premiums, still have
two of the three lowest employment growth rates.
The interesting aspect is that while surgery does
appear almost to have achieved a compensating wage
differential with a 119.2% increase in insurance premiums countered by a 114% salary increase, it has
by far the lowest employment growth of 11%. On
the other hand, malpractice premiums in Pediatrics
grew almost twice as fast as salaries, 186.2% compared to 99.4%, and yet experienced 73.8% employment growth.
Combining the specialties into high and low-risk
categories with respect to malpractice, as determined
by the level of malpractice premiums, creates a highrisk specialty group of Surgery and Obstetrics/Gynecology and a low-risk specialty group of General/
Family Practice, Internal Medicine and Pediatrics.
Table 3 depicts employment, malpractice premium
The Park Place Economist Volume X
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TAB LE 1

Descriptive Statistics for Five Main Specialty Groups
Spe cialty
Pe rce nt Change in Ave rage M alpractice Ave rage Salary
Employme nt (1998)
Pre mium (1995)
(1995)
General/Family Practice
2 .2 6 %
$ 9 ,0 0 0
$ 13 1,2 0 0
Internal Medicine
- .6 7 %
$ 9 ,4 0 0
$ 18 5 ,7 00
Surgery
- 1.19 %
$ 2 3 ,3 0 0
$ 2 6 9 ,4 00
Pediatrics
2 .9 0 %
$ 7 ,9 0 0
$ 14 0 ,5 00
O bstetrics/Gynecology
.6 5 %
$ 3 8 ,6 0 0
$ 2 4 4 ,3 00
and salary growth with the specialties divided into the
two categories of low-risk and high-risk. Now it
becomes clearer that the high-risk specialties have
had greater increases in both malpractice premiums
and salaries but have experienced half of the employment growth that low-risk specialties have experienced.
Generating an empirical model from this descriptive data, then, would entail running two separate OLS
regressions, one on high-risk specialties and one on
low-risk specialties, to compare the effects malpractice has on them. My hypothesis is that malpractice
should have a greater impact on employment in highrisk specialties.
The dependent variable chosen was SPECIALTY, which I measured through the number of
actively employed physicians in each specialty. In
that way, the number of physicians is representative
of the demand for each specialty per year. Since
fringes and training costs are more abstract concepts
to measure, and do not really pertain to my research
problem regarding malpractice, I have omitted them
from my model. Instead, my two independent variables consist of MALPRAC and SALARY.
I chose to measure the effects of malpractice on
physicians through the price of insurance premiums
due to the fact that premiums should take into ac-

count not only an increase in the volume of lawsuits
filed but also the increased severity of claims awarded.
I hypothesize that MALPRAC will have a negative
impact on SPECIALTY due to the fact that it represents an added cost to the physician. Hence,
MALPRAC should produce a negative coefficient
in the regression.
Furthermore, my other independent variable,
SALARY, which is represented with the average annual income per physician in each specialty, should
have a positive impact on SPECIALTY since it represents a benefit, in this case a profit, to the physician.
In general, the higher the compensation a physician
receives for his services, the more likely he is to perform such services. Thus, I predict that the SALARY variable will produce a positive coefficient in
the regression. Finally, both SALARY and
MALPRAC will be lagged in order to take into account the fact that medical students choose the specialty into which they will enter years before they actually become employed in that specialty. The lag will
be for two years since that is what seemed to work
the best. A summary of all variables is shown below
in Table 4.
Ultimately, the empirical model for this crosssectional time series study on the five main medical
specialties from 1982 to 1998 thus resembles the fol-

TAB LE 2

Employment, Malpractice, and Salary Growth Rates per Specialty
Spe cialty
Employme nt Growth, Growth in M alpractice Growth in Salarie s ,
1983-1998
Pre miums , 1982-1998
1982-1998
General/Family Practice
2 9 .8 %
10 4%
9 4 .8 %
Internal Medicine
5 4 .7 %
14 0 .5%
113.7%
Surgery
11.3%
119.2%
114%
Pediatrics
7 3 .8 %
18 6 .2 %
9 9 .4 %
O bstetrics/Gynecology
3 4 .8 %
2 2 5 .9 %
10 5 .7 %
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TAB LE 3

Employment, Malpractice, and Salary Growth in Low and High Risk Specialties
Spe cialty
Low Risk
High Risk

Employme nt Growth,
1983-1998
4 9 .2 %
2 1.8 %

Growth in M alpractice
Pre miums , 1982-1998
15 3 .5 %
17 4 .9%

lowing:
SPECIALTY = a1 + a2 SALARY + a3
MALPRAC
Data for SPECIALTY comes from editions
1990 to 2001 of Physician Characteristics and
Distribution in the US, a publication of the American Medical Association (AMA). All data on physicians in these editions were compiled from the AMAs
Physician Masterfile, a comprehensive database of
physician and medical student information maintained
by the Division of Survey and Data. The Masterfile is
widely considered the most complete and extensive
source of physician-related information in the United
States. It contains records of all individuals entering
medical school, with information updated by the Physicians Practice Arrangements questionnaire, which
has evolved into a rotating census which surveys approximately one-third of all physicians yearly. Additionally, I acquired information for both SALARY and
MALPRAC from an AMA publication as well, Socioeconomic Characteristics of Medical Practice,
editions 1988, 1995, and 1997/1998. Information in
this book comes from the Socioeconomic Monitoring System, with statistics derived from annual surveys of physicians across the country collected by
the Center for Health Policy Research, a division of
the AMA.

Growth in Salarie s ,
1982-1998
10 3 .4 %
110.1%

V. Results
Three regressions were run on the data. The first
consists of the high-risk specialties of Surgery and
Obstetrics/Gynecology; the second on the low-risk
specialties of General/Family Practice, Internal Medicine, and Pediatrics. I did this in an attempt to see
whether malpractice affects specialties differently. In
addition to the aforementioned regressions on highrisk and low-risk specialties, a third regression was
run on all five specialties to see how they react to
changes in compensation and malpractice as a whole.
As displayed in Table 5, the results of the first
regression were fairly good. The adjusted R-squared
was .504, meaning that my model explains slightly
over 50% of the variation in SPECIALTY. Additionally, both MALPRAC and SALARY have the
predicted signs, negative and positive respectively.
However, while SALARY proved to be extremely
significant, MALPRAC is highly insignificant. Thus,
this regression shows that high-risk specialties are affected by SALARY at a much greater level than
MALPRAC, suggesting that compensating wage differentials may indeed be in place.
Table 6 shows the results for Regression 2, which
had an even better adjusted R-squared of .572.
Though both variables display the predicted signs, I

TAB LE 4

Variable
D e pe nde nt

SPECIALTY

Inde pe nde nt SALARY
MALPRAC

Empirical Model Variables
D e finition
number of physicians actively
employed per specialty
average yearly income per
physician by specialty
average yearly insurance
premium paid per physician
by specialty

Pre dicte d Sign

+
-

The Park Place Economist Volume X
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TAB LE 5

Regression #1 Results
Variable
Coe fficie nt Significance
SALARY

.0 4 5 2 6

.0 0 0

MALPRAC - .0516

.3 2 4

R2
.5 5 6

Adjus te d R 2 D e gre e s of
Fre e dom
.5 0 4
17

find that SALARY is highly significant while
MALPRAC is insiginicant for the low-risk specialties. However, MALPRAC was even more insignificant in this regression than in the first regression,
so my hypothesis that MALPRAC would affect highrisk specialties more than low-risk specialties does
appear to be correct. Additionally, these findings
again support a case for compensating wage differentials.
Finally, I ran the third regression out of curiosity
to see how malpractice affected the specialties if not
split into the two categories. It presents some quite
interesting results, as displayed in Table 7. Both SALARY and MALPRAC have the predicted signs once
again, though the equation produced an adjusted Rsquared of only .349 this time. However, in a dramatic turn of events, MALPRAC is extremely significant, while SALARY is only significant at the .10
level. This suggests that the five specialties as a whole
react strongly to changes in malpractice costs but are
not as affected by changes in compensation.
Overall, then, the results of the regressions seem
to raise a few discrepancies. While MALPRAC is
highly insignificant for the first two regressions where
the specialties are split into high-risk and low-risk malpractice categories, quite a different story unfolds when
the third regression is run using all five specialties. In

TAB LE 6

Regression #2 Results
Variable
Coe fficie nt Significance
SALARY
.7 0 7
.0 0 0
MALPRAC - 2.167
.4 6 9
R2
.5 6 0

41

Adjus te d R 2 D e gre e s of
Fre e dom
.5 2 7
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TAB LE 7

Regression #3 Results
Variable
Coe fficie nt Significance
SALARY
.16 5
.0 6 6
MALPRAC - 2.183
.0 0 0
R2
.3 7 5

Adjus te d R 2 D e gre e s of
Fre e dom
.3 4 9
47

that case, MALPRAC is extremely significant, while
SALARY is less significant. The results of the first
two equations could be due to the fact that the SALARY in both high-risk and low-risk specialties is high
enough to offset any possible negatives that might accompany MALPRAC, suggesting possible compensating wage differentials. As for the lessened significance of SALARY in the third equation, while salaries may help students in their specialty decision-making process, the average physician makes far more
than the average employee regardless of specialty,
and therefore, slight fluctuations in compensation have
little effect on the labor market as a whole. Moreover, the significance of MALPRAC to the medical
labor market as a whole may be reflective of the fact
that once in the medical labor market salary determines specialty, but prior to that, malpractice may
scare potential medical students from ever entering
into the medical labor market to begin with.
VI. Conclusions
The main goal of this paper was to show that
malpractice has an adverse effect on high-risk medical specialties. The one concrete conclusion that can
be drawn from this study is that however significant,
malpractice has a negative effect on employment in
the medical field, while salary has a positive effect.
Furthermore, this study demonstrates that when split
into the categories of high and low-risk specialties,
malpractice does not seem to greatly impact specialty
employment, suggesting that perhaps compensating
wage differentials are in place. However, when medical employment was looked at as a whole, as represented by the five specialties examined, malpractice
was found to be an extremely significant determinant
of employment. Hence, its effects on individual specialties are not so easily discernible.
In part, this may be due to the fact that physician income and malpractice premiums vary widely
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across the country, depending on the legislation in
place in each area. For example, in Pennsylvania,
where there are no limits on jury awards in malpractice cases, malpractice premiums in many specialties
doubled earlier this spring. At the Frankford Hospital in Philadelphia, malpractice insurance spending rose
from $6 million to $12 million. Even worse, when
orthopedic surgeons medical malpractice premiums
doubled in January, hitting $90,000 annually, they refused to work, forcing the emergency department to
close for a few days. They had to make a statement
that they couldnt afford to stay in business, said Roy
Powell, chief executive officer of the hospital. Though
the surgeons were eventually coaxed back to work,
there is fear that doctors will soon leave the area permanently due to the high insurance rates (Thrall, 2001).
Additionally, concentrations of physicians by specialty
also vary across different areas of the country. Thus,
examining the country as a whole could be a little misleading. Perhaps future research could examine the
effects of malpractice in different areas of the country.
Moreover, influential variables may have been
left out of the study. For example, the percent change
in employment growth for the entire medical labor
market no doubt affects the specialty labor markets.
While the cost of medical school and perhaps even
the state of the economy do not directly affect the
choice of medical specialty, they do directly affect
how many students choose to enter medical school,
which in turn effects medical labor market, and consequently, specialty growth. Thus, these are all areas
which may need to be examined in future research.
Tort litigation in general is of economic
concern due to the vast amounts of wealth it accrues
in transfer activity. However, the economic implications go even farther when specifically examining the
growing trend in medical malpractice suits, which may
be acting as a supply shock to the medical labor market. Only time and future research will tell whether
this is the case or whether compensating wage differentials are indeed in place.
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